

Session Juggler

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About this presentation

Date: 19 April 2012

Conference: WWW 2012

URL: <http://ly.tl/p23>

Feel free to contact me
if you have any question











Afraid of the Dark ?



Afraid of the Dark ?



Looking for something ?

D:\Sources\perfect keylogger\Release - Log Viewer

March, 2003

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
23	24	25	26	27	28	1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31	1	2	3	4	5

Today: 3/8/2003

Show: Keystrokes Screenshots Websites

Click an image to enlarge.
Screenshot made at 7:55:14 A

Click to view in actual

PERFECT KEYLOGGER

Select a date or date range in the calendar to view log records. Drag the mouse to select a range of dates.



PC Spy Keylogger

Global Setting

Delivery via Email

Delivery via FTP

Password Setup

Register Now

PC Spy Keylogger
Build V 2.0
Basic Edition

▶ Monitor engine started

Handy Keylogger

Start keylogging Stop keylogging

Register Help

Preferences View logs Clear logs About



General settings

Save options

Enable monitoring warning at startup
This computer is being monitored.

Enable graphics clipboard monitoring

Enable text clipboard monitoring

WEB activity interval (seconds): 20

Grayscale snapshots

Snapshots making interval (min): 5

Replace system keys with images in logs

Snapshots making quality, % (min > max)

Protect password: ■■■■

E-mail sending settings

Wizard

Send logs from: widestep@gmail.com Send logs to: widestep@gmail.com


SMTP server: gsmtpl71.google.com SMTP server port: 25

Logs e-mail interval (hours): 1 Letter size limit (Kb): 500

To enable e-mailing logs, set a positive "Logs e-mail interval", specify your SMTP server details and wait for your logs to arrive. Refer to the manual for details and help.


engine running... Copyright (c) 2001-2005 WideStep Software

Looking for something ?



HTTPS adoption

% of sites using HTTPS to log users



Ephemeral login

- Can't trust the client at all
- Work for **every browser every site**
- Use a secure device / secure channel (phone)

Not that easy

	[5]	[24]	[29]	[21]	[12]	[28]	[31]
year	1999	2004	2006	2007	2008	2008	2009
Trusted device	Palm Pilot	PDA	Phone	Phone	Phone	Phone	Phone
Requires server-side changes	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Requires client-side changes	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Connection type	USB	USB	Net	USB/BT	USB	Net	NFC
Hardware needed					TPM		TPM/NFC

Ephemeral login vs OTP

- Site specific password list proliferation
- Logout issue how to be sure ?

The image shows a screenshot of a Facebook news feed. The user's profile, Elie Bursztein, is visible in the top right corner. The news feed contains several posts, including one from Matt Jones via Jonathan Frank and another from Facebook titled "Facebook Implements 'Account Protection' Security Status Bar". A red arrow points from the text "Are you really trusting this?" to the "Logout" option in the account menu. The text "Are you really trusting this?" is overlaid in a large, orange, outlined font.



Sometime **bad** guys make the **best** good guys



Let's steal a session (demo)


In case the demo failed :)



Flow view



Phone



Blackboard



Unsecure terminal



Target website


← - - - - - 1. QR code exchange - - - - -

- - - - - ➔ Out of band exchange
- — — — — ➔ HTTP(S) traffic
- — — — — ➔ Encrypted data

Flow view



Phone



Blackboard



Unsecure terminal



Target website




- - - → Out of band exchange
- → HTTP(S) traffic
- → Encrypted data

Flow view



Phone



Blackboard



Unsecure terminal



Target website

← - - - - 1. QR code exchange - - - -

● ————— 2. Login —————→


● 3. {Session data}_k →

- - - → Out of band exchange
- — — → HTTP(S) traffic
- — — → Encrypted data

Flow view



Phone



Blackboard



Unsecure terminal



Target website

← - - - - 1. QR code exchange - - - -

● ————— 2. Login —————→

● 3. {Session data}_k →


← 4. {Session data}_k ●

- - - → Out of band exchange
- → HTTP(S) traffic
- → Encrypted data

Flow view



Phone



Blackboard



Unsecure terminal



Target website

← - - - - 1. QR code exchange - - - -

● ————— 2. Login —————→

● 3. {Session data}_k →

← 4. {Session data}_k ●

● — 5. Resume session ▶

- - - ▶ Out of band exchange
- ▶ HTTP(S) traffic
- ▶ Encrypted data

Hijacking defense

Defense	% of Alexa100
Login over HTTPS	83%
Using secure cookies	52%
Seperating mobile and desktop sessions	6%
Binding session to IP address	8%
Checking local time	1%
Binding session to user-agent header	0%
Binding session to local language	0%
Logout over HTTPS	1%

Experimental results

- Works on 98% of the Alexa top 100
- Can be extended to work against arbitrary defense

Conclusion

- Steal http session to provide a temporary login
- No server side or client modification

Thank you

Thank you !
Questions ?



Follow-me !
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More research: <http://elie.im/>

Alternative architecture

